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Abstract 
 Recently, Batabyal and Yoo (2018) have analyzed Schumpeterian competition in a region 
that is creative a la Richard Florida and where the creative class is made up of existing and 
candidate entrepreneurs. These researchers assume that an existing entrepreneur has a fully 
enforced patent on the inputs or machines that he has produced. We dispense with this 
assumption and study a scenario in which there is no patent protection for the representative 
existing entrepreneur (REE). This REE can undertake two possible types of innovation at the 
same cost. The first (second) type of innovation is general (specific) and hence can (cannot) be 
copied by the so called candidate entrepreneurs. In this setting, we perform two tasks. First, we 
show that although the REE will never undertake the general innovation, he may undertake the 
specific innovation. Second, we point out that even though the general innovation is not 
undertaken, the value to the creative region from the general innovation exceeds that from the 
specific innovation.  
Keywords: Creative Class, General Innovation, Patent, Specific Innovation 
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1. Introduction 
 There is no gainsaying the fact that both regional scientists and urban economists are now 
very familiar with the twin concepts of the creative class and creative capital. In this regard, the 
originator of both these concepts, Richard Florida (2002, p. 68), has helpfully explained that the 
creative class “consists of people who add economic value through their creativity.” In addition, 
this class is composed of a variety of professionals such as doctors, lawyers, scientists, engineers, 
university professors, and, notably, bohemians such as artists, musicians, and sculptors. We 
ought to think seriously about the activities of these people because they possess creative capital 
which is defined to be the “intrinsically human ability to create new ideas, new technologies, 
new business models, new cultural forms, and whole new industries that really [matter]” 
(Florida, 2005, p. 32). 
According to Florida (2014), the group of people constituting the creative class gives rise 
to ideas, information, and technology, outputs that are important for the growth and development 
of cities and regions.1 From a practical perspective, what this means is that in our present-day era 
of globalization, regions that want to be successful need to do all they can to attract and retain 
members of the creative class because this class is the principal driver of regional economic 
growth. The above ideas of Richard Florida have now been theoretically and empirically studied 
by several researchers. Therefore, we now review this literature and then describe the specific 
contribution of the present paper.  
2. Literature Review 
Eversole (2005) maintains that present theories of regional development, inspired in part 
by Florida’s thinking about the creative class, have resulted in the harvesting of the grassroots 
                                                            
1  
See Florida (2008) and Florida et al. (2008) for additional details on this point. 
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creativity of local communities in order to pursue certain development goals. Focusing on the 
Montreal region, Stolarick and Florida (2006) contend that certain kinds of interactions among 
the business, creative, design, and technical communities can have a positive impact on the 
innovative and total business activity in this region.  
Qian (2010) concentrates on China and shows that the human capital notion outweighs 
the creative class concept in terms of its effects on entrepreneurship, innovation, and regional 
economic performance. What roles have entrepreneurship and innovation played in the regional 
development of Japan? Westlund and Calidoni (2010) focus on the contemporary perspectives of 
Richard Florida and Robert Putnam to study this question. On the basis of their study, they first 
note that it is not possible to give unambiguous support to either of these two perspectives. They 
then provide reasons to explain the prevalence of this state of affairs.  
Are Richard Florida’s ideas about what needs to be done to ensure the economic 
prosperity of cities and regions relevant in the context of large and small “city regions” in the 
Nordic nations? Andersen et al. (2010) analyze this question and show that the answer depends 
on the “city region” under consideration. Specifically, we learn that for large Nordic city regions, 
Florida’s ideas are pertinent but the same cannot be said for smaller Nordic city regions. Oliveira 
and Breda-Vazquez (2012) concentrate on what they call the “Oporto city-region” in part 
because a significant component of the population of this city-region is not a member of the 
creative class. As such, it is unlikely that this component will benefit from urban development 
plans based on creativity and innovation. This notwithstanding, we learn that appropriately 
designed urban policy can be used to disseminate social innovation to Oporto city-region 
residents who are not members of the creative class. 
5 
 
Batabyal and Nijkamp (2013) use a theoretical model and show how the preferences of 
the creative class influence the attributes of the so called constant growth path (CGP) equilibrium 
in an urban economy. Gabe et al. (2013) use individual-level data from the United States Current 
Population Surveys and show that in the 2006-2011 time period, relative to other workers, 
members of the creative class had a lower likelihood of being unemployed and that the benefit of 
being employed in a creative occupation rose over time.  
Like Andersen et al. (2010), Tohmo (2015) focuses on Nordic regions and points out that 
there is a clear positive association between the existing creative class in these regions and the 
birth rate of high-technology firms. In a paper that has both theoretical and empirical emphases, 
Buettner and Janeba (2016) contend that in some scenarios, German cities face strong incentives 
to attract members of the creative class by providing these members with the apposite amenities. 
Finally, Goldberg-Miller and Fregetto (2016) contend that if the meaning of what it means for a 
sector in an urban setting to be creative is broadened then this broader meaning of a creative 
sector can be effectively employed to revive decaying and decrepit areas and neighborhoods in 
today’s cities.  
Recently, Batabyal and Yoo (2018) have analyzed Schumpeterian competition2 in a 
region that is creative in the sense of Richard Florida and where the creative class is made up of 
existing and candidate entrepreneurs. These researchers assume that an existing entrepreneur has 
a fully enforced patent on the inputs or machines that he has produced. This assumption 
notwithstanding, one can certainly ask: What are the properties of innovative activity that arises 
from the competition between existing and candidate entrepreneurs when there is no patent 
                                                            
2  
See Batabyal and Nijkamp (2014) and Batabyal and Beladi (2016) for additional perspectives on Schumpeterian competition and 
regional economic growth.  
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protection for the representative existing entrepreneur (REE)? The basic contribution of our 
paper is to shed light on this hitherto unstudied and yet salient research question. 
The model we work with is adapted from Acemoglu (2009, pp. 416-422) and Batabyal 
and Yoo (2018). This model is described in detail in section 3 and as noted there, the REE can 
undertake two possible types of innovation at the same cost. The first (second) type of innovation 
is general (specific) and therefore can (cannot) be copied by the candidate entrepreneurs. In this 
setting, we perform two tasks. First, in section 4, we show that although the REE will never 
undertake the general innovation, he may undertake the specific innovation. Next, in section 5, 
we point out that even though the general innovation is not undertaken, the value to the creative 
region from the general innovation exceeds that from the specific innovation. Finally, in section 
6, we conclude and then offer two suggestions for extending the research delineated in this 
paper. 
3. The Theoretical Framework 
 Consider a stylized region that is creative in the sense of Richard Florida. There is no 
uncertainty. Following Batabyal and Yoo (2018), the creative class in this region consists of 
existing entrepreneurs. There are a large number of ܰ ൐ 0 existing entrepreneurs. As a result of 
having undertaken research and development (R&D), these existing entrepreneurs have access to 
a technology that can be used to produce one unit of the final consumption good that we suppose 
is a knowledge good such as a smartphone. The output of this knowledge good is denoted by ܱ. 
The marginal cost of producing one unit of output ܱ is ߞ ൐ 0. The demand for output ܱ is given 
by the function ܦሺ∙ሻ where  
 
ܱ ൌ ܦሺܲሻ,       (1) 
7 
 
ܲ ൐ 0 is the price of the knowledge good, ܦᇱሺܲሻ ൏ 0, ܦሺߞሻ ൐ 0, and the price elasticity of 
demand ߳஽ሺܲሻ ൌ െܲܦ′ሺܲሻ ܦሺܲሻ⁄  lies in the open interval ሺ1,∞ሻ. In words, the assumption 
ܦሺߞሻ ൐ 0 means that there is positive demand for the knowledge good when its price is equal to 
the marginal cost of production. In addition, the assumption about the magnitude of the price 
elasticity of demand means that a profit maximizing (monopoly) price for the knowledge good 
exists and that the monopoly price of the knowledge good exceeds the marginal cost of 
producing it.  
 Now, of the ܰ different existing entrepreneurs, suppose that one particular entrepreneur, 
that is, the REE, has access to a technology that gives rise to two possible process innovations. 
The cost of undertaking either of these two innovations is identical and denoted by ܥ ൐ 0. We 
suppose that there is no patent protection available to the REE. From a practical perspective, this 
means that these process innovations are both non-rival and non-excludable.3  
 Of the two possible innovations generated by the REE, the first innovation results in a 
general technological improvement and therefore this innovation can be copied by all the 
remaining ܰ െ 1 entrepreneurs. To clearly distinguish between the REE and the remaining 
entrepreneurs, we shall refer to these ܰ െ 1 entrepreneurs as candidate entrepreneurs. The 
reader should note that these candidate entrepreneurs are able to copy a general innovation 
undertaken by the REE. The general innovation reduces the marginal cost of producing one unit 
of the knowledge good from ߞ to ߞ ߚ⁄  where ߚ ൐ 1. The second innovation is specific to the 
production process employed by the REE and therefore this innovation cannot be copied by the 
candidate entrepreneurs. This specific innovation reduces the marginal cost of producing one 
unit of the final good by ߚመ ൏ ߚ.  
                                                            
3  
The impact of two types of process innovations on regional economic growth in the presence of patent protection is discussed in 
Batabyal and Yoo (2018). 
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Now, with this theoretical framework in place, our next task is to demonstrate that 
although the REE will never undertake the general innovation, he may undertake the specific 
innovation. While undertaking this exercise, we shall adapt some of the results in Peters and 
Simsek (2009, pp. 192-193) to our analysis of creative class competition and innovation in the 
absence of patent protection.  
4. The Innovation Decision 
4.1. Intuitive discussion 
To see why the REE will never undertake the general innovation, note the following line 
of reasoning. Undertaking the general innovation will result in ex post competition with the 
candidate entrepreneurs and this competition will reduce the price of the knowledge good from 
the pre-innovation marginal production cost ߞ to the post-innovation marginal production cost 
ߞ ߚ.⁄  In other words, both before and after undertaking the general innovation, the revenue to the 
REE is zero and the benefit from this innovation is െܥ.  
4.2. Theoretical analysis 
Following Acemoglu (2009, pp. 418-419), let us call an innovation a drastic innovation if 
undertaking this innovation will result in the REE becoming a monopolist. Now recall from the 
discussion in section 3 that the specific innovation reduces the marginal cost of producing one 
unit of the final good by ߚመ ൏ ߚ. This means that the specific innovation is less drastic than the 
general innovation.4 Given this state of affairs, the key question now is this: Will the REE 
undertake a specific innovation? Let us investigate. 
It is clear that if the REE does not undertake the specific innovation then his profit is 
zero. On the other hand, if the REE does undertake the specific innovation then in the post-
                                                            
4  
See Acemoglu (2009, pp. 418-420) for a textbook discussion of the differences between drastic and non-drastic innovations. 
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innovation scenario, he will have monopoly power. So, to understand the innovation decision in 
this case, we need to distinguish between two cases. These are the “drastic” and the “non-
drastic” cases delineated in Proposition 12.1 in Acemoglu (2009, p. 419).  
Let ܲெ denote the monopoly price of the knowledge good whose output is denoted by ܱ. 
Then, from the above mentioned Proposition 12.1, we can deduce that the threshold ߚ் that 
determines the boundary between a drastic and a non-drastic innovation is given by  
 
ߚ் ൌ ଵଵିሼଵ ఢವሺ௉ಾሻ⁄ ሽ.      (2) 
 
Now, if ߚመ ൒ ߚ் then the specific innovation is, for all intents and purposes, a drastic innovation 
and the REE will end up charging the monopoly price for the knowledge good under 
consideration. In this case, his profit can be expressed as  
 
Πோாா෣ ൌ ܲெܦሺܲெሻ െ ఍ఉ෡ ܦሺܲெሻ െ ܥ.     (3) 
 
On the other hand, if ߚመ ൏ ߚ் then the specific innovation undertaken by the REE is non-drastic 
and Proposition 12.1 in Acemoglu (2009, p. 419) tells us that this REE will resort to what is 
known as limit pricing. In turn, this pricing strategy will lead to a different expression denoting 
profit for the REE. The expression of interest is given by  
 
Πோாா ൌ ߞܦሺߞሻ െ ఍ఉ෡ ܦሺߞሻ െ ܥ.     (4) 
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 Given equations (3) and (4), we can now explicitly state our REE’s two-part decision rule 
for ascertaining whether he ought to or not to undertake a specific innovation. The first part of 
this rule tells us that  
 
ߚመ ൒ ߚ் 	⇒ ݅݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݁	 ⇔ 	 ቄܲெ െ ఍ఉ෡ቅܦሺܲெሻ ൒ ܥ.    (5) 
 
Similarly, the second part of this two-part rule tells us that  
 
ߚመ ൏ ߚ் 	⇒ ݅݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݁	 ⇔ 	 ቄߞ െ ఍ఉ෡ቅܦሺߞሻ ൒ ܥ,    (6) 
 
and the reader should note that ൛ߞ െ ߞ ߚመ⁄ ൟܦሺߞሻ in equation (6) can also be expressed as 
൫1 ߚመ⁄ ൯൫ߚመ െ 1൯ߞܦሺߞሻ. 
 The section 3 discussion about the structure of our model tells us that the expressions 
൛ܲெ െ ߞ ߚመ⁄ ൟܦሺܲெሻ and ൛ߞ െ ߞ ߚመ⁄ ൟܦሺߞሻ in equations (5) and (6) respectively are positive. This 
point leads to the conclusion that there must exist some value of the innovation cost, say ܥ௏൫ߚመ൯, 
which is a function of the innovation parameter ߚመ, such that the REE will want to undertake a 
specific innovation whenever the actual innovation cost ܥ ൑ ܥ௏൫ߚመ൯. In other words, we have just 
demonstrated that the REE may undertake a specific innovation that cannot be copied by the 
candidate entrepreneurs with whom the REE is in competition. This notwithstanding, the reader 
should note that this specific innovation is inferior in the sense that it is a less drastic innovation 
than the general innovation that we analyzed in the first paragraph of this section. Our next and 
final task in this paper is to show that even though the general innovation is not undertaken, the 
11 
 
value to the creative region under study from the general innovation exceeds that from the 
specific innovation.  
5. The Value of Innovation to the Creative Region 
5.1. Intuitive discussion 
 We begin with a definition. Let the value of innovation to our creative region be given by 
the increase in consumer and producer surplus from an innovation less the cost of undertaking 
this innovation. In addition, we suppose that a benevolent “regional planner” makes pricing 
decisions in our creative region, keeping in mind the welfare of everybody in the region. This 
means that the regional planner will maximize our creative region’s welfare by setting the price 
of the knowledge good (the marginal value) equal to the marginal cost of producing it.  
5.2. Theoretical analysis 
 Let us denote the value to our creative region from the general innovation (ߚ innovation) 
and the specific innovation (ߚመ  innovation) by ܸீሺߚሻ and ܸௌሺߚመ) respectively. Now, given the 
definition in the preceding paragraph, the value to our creative region from the general 
innovation can be expressed as  
 
ܸீሺߚሻ ൌ ׬ ܦሺܲሻ݀ܲ െ ܥ ൌ ׬ ܦሺܲሻ݀ܲ ൅ ׬ ܦሺܲሻ݀ܲ െ ܥ.఍఍ ఉ෡⁄
఍ ఉ෡⁄
఍ ఉ⁄
఍
఍ ఉ⁄    (7) 
 
Some thought tells us that the right-hand-side (RHS) of equation (7) can be simplified and 
written, in part, in terms of ܸௌ൫ߚመ൯. Doing this, we get 
 
ܸீሺߚሻ ൌ ׬ ܦሺܲሻ݀ܲ ൅ ܸௌ఍ ఉ෡⁄఍ ఉ⁄ ൫ߚመ൯ ൐ ܸௌ൫ߚመ൯.    (8) 
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Equation (8) tells us that the value to our creative region from the general innovation clearly 
exceeds the corresponding value from the specific innovation. Now recall that in the last 
paragraph of section 4 we had pointed out that compared to the general innovation, the specific 
innovation is inferior. Equation (8) shows us that this inferiority stems from the fact that the 
specific innovation gives rise to a lower level of surplus in our creative region. This completes 
our analysis of competition and innovative activity undertaken by the creative class in the 
absence of patent protection.  
6. Conclusions 
 In this paper, we continued a line of inquiry begun by Batabyal and Yoo (2018). These 
researchers analyzed Schumpeterian competition in a region that was creative in the sense of 
Richard Florida and where the creative class was composed of existing and candidate 
entrepreneurs. These researchers assumed that an existing entrepreneur had a fully enforced 
patent on the inputs or machines that he developed. We dispensed with this assumption and 
studied a scenario in which there was no patent protection for the REE. This REE could 
undertake two possible types of innovation at the same cost. The first (second) type of innovation 
was general (specific) and therefore could (could not) be copied by the candidate entrepreneurs. 
The contribution of our paper is that in this setting, we performed two research tasks. First, we 
showed that although the REE would never undertake the general innovation, he might undertake 
the specific innovation. Second, we pointed out that even though the general innovation was not 
undertaken, the value to the creative region from the general innovation exceeded the 
corresponding value from the specific innovation.  
 The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of different directions. Here are 
two suggestions for augmenting the research described here. First, it would be instructive to 
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model the notion of a trade secret explicitly to see whether trade secrets provide adequate 
incentives for undertaking innovations in a competitive scenario in which patent protection is 
unavailable. Second, it would also be useful to analyze a model of the sort studied in this paper 
in a dynamic setting in which the copying of innovations undertaken by the REE occurs with a 
lag and over a finite time period. The analysis of such a model may involve the use of 
simulations. Studies that incorporate these aspects of the problem into the analysis will increase 
our understanding of the nexuses between entrepreneurial competition in the creative class and 
the emergence of process and product innovations.  
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